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INTRODUCTION 
 This article addresses a question at the core of antitrust 
enforcement:  how should government enforcers or other plaintiffs 
show harm from antitrust violations?  The inquiry naturally breaks 
into two issues: proof of harm and proof of causation.  The best 
criterion for assessing harm is likely or reasonably anticipated output 
effects.  The standard for proof of causation depends in part on two 
things: the identify of the enforcer and the remedy that the plaintiff is 
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seeking.  It does not necessarily depend on which antitrust statute the 
plaintiff is seeking to enforce.1 
For public enforcers such as the Antitrust Division or the 
Federal Trade Commission, enforcement involves both the 
condemnation of past harm and the management of future risks.  The 
concern, as in most areas of public enforcement, is with behavior that 
is likely to have harmful anticompetitive consequences unless it is 
restrained. While a showing of actual harm can be important 
evidence, in most cases the public authorities need not show that the 
harm has actually occurred, but only that the challenged conduct 
poses an unreasonable danger that it will occur. 
By contrast, private enforcers operate under stricter causation 
requirements that require an actual injury for damages actions, or 
individually threatened injury for an injunction.  These differences 
are explicit in the various federal statutes that authorize enforcement 
actions.2  They are also similar to the division of requirements in the 
legal system generally, particularly in the distinction between public 
criminal law and the private law of tortious conduct. 
ANTITRUST WELFARE AND COMPETITION 
The Blackboard Economics and Legislative History of Welfare Tradeoffs 
 Many practices that are challenged under the antitrust laws 
can have possible effects that pull in two different directions.  On the 
one hand, they can enhance market power or facilitate its exercise, 
thus harming consumers as well as other affected groups.  On the 
other hand, they can produce efficiencies that benefit consumers as 
well as the suppliers of inputs, including labor.  If a practice plausibly 
produces only harmful effects but is unlikely to offer benefits, then 
antitrust law condemns it with only modest analysis.  This is true, for 
example, of naked price fixing or market division, which are then 
 
1 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
2 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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said to be illegal per se.3  At the other extreme, if a practice is highly 
unlikely to facilitate the exercise of market power and has a serious 
potential for beneficial effects, then we can approve it with little 
analysis. 
 In the middle are worrying cases where a plausible argument 
can be made that the effect of the restraint can go in either direction.  
These call for more searching inquiry under a rule of reason.  How 
these potentially offsetting effects should be measured has provoked 
a great deal of debate.  In 1968 Oliver Williamson proposed that we 
think of these offsetting effects as components in what he termed a 
“welfare tradeoff” model.4  On the one hand, a practice might 
facilitate the creation of monopoly, resulting in a harm to consumers 
that he identified with the “deadweight loss” of monopoly.  On the 
other hand, the practice might also reduce costs, which is a social 
benefit.  Theoretically one can measure both of these effects and 
trade them off against each other.  We could proclaim a practice as 
either harmful or beneficial depending on which number is larger. 
 In 1978 Robert H. Bork borrowed the idea of the welfare 
tradeoff and popularized it for use by antitrust lawyers, but he also 
renamed it the “consumer welfare” model.5 Copying from 
Williamson, Bork illustrated this model with the figure below, which 
is taken straight from his book.6  He hypothesized a merger, joint 
venture or other practice that simultaneously increased the market 
power of its participants, producing the shaded deadweight loss area 
A1; but it also produced “cost savings,” or efficiencies, designated by 
shaded area A2.  The unshaded square immediately above the A2 cost 
savings is a wealth transfer from consumers to producers.  Consistent 
with neoclassical welfare economics generally, both Williamson and 
 
3 See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1911 (4th ed. 2018). 
4 Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968). 
5ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF (1978). 
6 Id. at 107. 
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Bork deemed this to be a wash: it impoverished consumers but 
benefitted producers by the same amount and thus had no effect on 
overall welfare. 
 Bork’s treatment of the issue, which was similar in most 
respects to Williamson’s treatment, has been extremely influential 
among antitrust writers, cited more than 800 times in the law review 
articles alone.7  It has also been very controversial.  People have 
firmly defended it, completely rejected it, or attempted to revise it.   
 
One thing that has been largely missing, however, is serious 
discussion of the tradeoff model’s factual robustness. The question is 
a simple one: what are the circumstances in which a merger or joint 
venture produces effects that resemble those in the picture?  Or is this 
drawing simply something that Ronald Coase derisively called 
“blackboard economics” – a phenomenon that exists in an 
economist’s classroom musings, and that may require great 
 
7 Based on Westlaw search, Jan. 31, 2021. 
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intellectual skill to develop, but cannot be found anywhere in the real 
world?8  
The real problem in the figure in Bork’s book is not the 
shaded deadweight loss triangle (A1), the cost savings rectangle (A2), 
or the unshaded neutral wealth transfer square.  All three of these 
elements have been mentioned many times in discussions about the 
social cost of monopoly or about the magnitude and types of 
efficiency gains.  Rather, the problem appears at the very bottom of 
Bork’s figure, in the relationship between O1 and O2, which Bork did 
not mention and has received little discussion.   O1 in the figure is the 
output of the firms involved in this merger or joint venture prior to its 
formation. O2 represents the output of these same firms after the 
venture has been formed or the merger has occurred.  In Bork’s 
figure, O2 is roughly half way betwen the Origin, or zero output point 
on the graph, and O1. That is, this particular merger or joint venture 
produced both consumer harm (A1) and offsetting cost savings (A2), 
but in the process it reduced the output of the firm or firms involved 
by roughly one-half. 
While the figure indicates a 50% output reduction, the actual 
amount depends on several assumptions and can be either greater 
than or less than one half.  The relevant variables are the magnitude 
of the efficiencies, the amount of market power both before and after 
the challenged restraint occurred, and the slope and shape of the 
demand curve.  I do not know why Bork drew the figure as he did.  
He could have drawn it any way he wanted because, after all, he was 
 
8RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 19, 28 (1989).  
See id. at 19: 
Blackboard economics is undoubtedly an exercise requiring great 
intellectual ability, and it may have a role in developing the skills 
of an economist, but it misdirects our attention when thinking about 
economic policy. 
See also Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 
357 (1974).  See also Donald N. (now Dierdre) McCloskey, The Lawyerly 
Rhetoric of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, 18 J. Corp. L. 425 (1993). 
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not building a real plant or creating a real merger or joint venture.  
He was simply pushing some chalk around on a blackboard. 
Nevertheless, a little reflection should have provoked this 
question: when in the real world does a merger or joint venture 
reduce a firm’s output by half at the same time that it produces such 
significant cost savings?  In the figure the output reduction is 50% 
and the cost savings appear to be in the neighborhood of 1/3 of the 
total costs of production.9  Output prior to the merger or joint venture 
was at the competitive level.  Although costs are lower after this 
event occurs, output has been reduced to a little more than 1/3 of the 
competitive level.10 
By far the most common economy associated with a firm’s 
production changes is economies of scale.11  Historically, suboptimal 
plant capacity has been fairly common in American markets, 
suggesting that bigger plants could produce lower costs.12  There are 
also multiplant economies, which accrue to firms that operate 
multiple plants.13  A merger does not make a plant larger, although it 
could help a firm achieve multiplant economies, such as by enabling 
it to specialize production in different plants.  Nevertheless, a merger 
of two firms with small plants does not itself produce a bigger plant.  
Rather, it simply yields one firm that owns two small plants. 
 
9 That is the distance from P1 down to 0. 
10 The subsequent competitive level is the point where the demand curve 
intersects the lowered cost curve, AC2.  
11See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶975b (4th ed. 2016) 
12Leonard Weiss, Optimal Plant Size and the Extent of Suboptimal 
Capacity, in ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 136-141 (Robert T. 
Masson & P. David Qualls eds., 1976)   See also Mark Hirschey, 
Suboptimal Plant Capacity in U.S. Manufacturing, 12 ECON LETTERS 73 
(1983) 
13E.g., Alan R. Beckenstein, Scale Economies in the Multiplant Firm: 
Theory and Empirical Evidence, 6 BELL J. ECON. 644 (1975); FREDERIC M. 
SCHERER, et al., THE ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS STUDY (1975). 
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Further, these economies almost always occur at higher rather 
than lower output.  The very iea of an economy of scale is a cost that 
declines as output goes up. Further, any market in which durable 
monopoly is a serous possibility is virtually certain to have 
significant fixed costs, including most costs associated with research 
and development as well as intellectual property.  One important 
characteristic of fixed costs is that they vary inversely with output.  
That is, if output is cut in half, fixed costs per unit over that range 
will double.  This is so because fixed costs do not change as output 
changes.  Per unit fixed costs are computed by dividing the fixed 
costs, a stationery number, by the number of units of output.  For 
example, a firm might have fixed costs of $100 and be producing 100 
units per time period, so its average fixed costs are $1 per unit.  If 
this firm cuts it output in half, to 50 units, its average fixed costs will 
rise to $2 per unit.   The firm in Bork’s illustration must have been 
one for which fixed costs were negligible. 
To be sure, there are other economies whose relationship to 
scale is either less direct or that may even be achievable at lower 
output.  For example, firms might merge or form joint ventures in 
order to acquire better management, equipmment or an operational 
culture more conducive to innovation, a better portfolio of 
intellectual property rights, governmental licenses, or some other 
desirable input held by an acquired firm.  For the most part, however, 
these are not the merger specific efficiencies that the law requires.14  
That is, the firms can attain them by means other than merger. 
Further, while a few mergers might facilitate innovation, there 
is little reason for thinking that mergers that actually lead to high 
concentration levels or monopolistic output reductions fall into that 
category.  Indeed, theoretical and empirical studies overwhelmingly 
 
14 See 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note __, ¶973. 
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conclude the opposite; namely, mergers in more concentrated 
markets are associated with less, not more, innovaiton.15 
In some cases the cost savings may be so large, that they 
completely offset the price increase caused by the challenged merger 
or other practice.  In that case the result is higher output. Consumers 
are not harmed at all, however, so there is nothing to trade off.  The 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines require such situations as a 
requirement for a successful “efficiency defense” to a merger – that 
is, the cost savings must be shown to be so significant that the post-
merger price will be no higher than it was before the merger.16 
Nothing in the statutory language or legislative history of the 
antitrust laws compels or even discusses the welfare tradeoff. The 
Sherman Act refers only to agreements in restraint of trade and 
monopolization.  Section 7 of the Clayton Act, where much of the 
discussion of welfare tradeoffs has been focused, prohibits mergers 
 
15E.g., Giulio Federico, et al, Horizontal Mergers and Product Innovation, 
61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 590 (2018); Giulio Frederico, et al, A Simple 
Model of Mergers and Innovation, 157 ECON. LETTERS 136 (2018) (post-
merger firm generally reduces its innovation while competing non-merging 
firms increase it); Mitsuru Igami and Kosuke Uetake, Mergers, Innovation, 
and Entry-Exit Dynamics: Consolidation of the Hard Disk Drive Industry 
1996-2016, 87 REV. ECON. STUD. 2672 (2020); William S. Comanor & 
Frederic M. Scherer, Mergers an Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 106 (2013); Carmine Ornaghi, Mergers and 
Innovation in Big Pharma, 27 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 70 (2009).  More mixed 
are Bruno Jullien & Yassine Lefouili, Horizontal Mergers and Innovation, 
14 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 364 (2018); Michael L. Katz, Big Tech Mergers: 
Innovation, Competition for the Market, and the Acquisition of Emerging 
Competitors, INFORMATION ECONOMICS AND POLICY (2020) 




16Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines §10 (August, 2010), available at 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010. 
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where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition,”17  It 
never speaks of efficiencies at all, and certainly does not address any 
kind of efficiency tradeoff or an efficiency defense. 
 The legislative history is not helpful either.  A few scattered 
passages in the legislative history of the Sherman Act speak about 
efficiency or product superiority, but always in the absence of 
competitive harm.  For example, in a widely quoted passage in the 
legislative history of the Sherman Act, Senator John Edward Kenna 
of West Virginia asked whether a rancher who was better than 
anyone else at raising shorthorn cattle for sale to Mexico violated the 
Sherman Act. Senator George F. Edmunds from Vermont responded 
that the statute would not condemn someone who “got the whole 
business because nobody could do it as well as he could.”18 Senator 
George Hoar of Massachusetts, a principal draftsperson of the statute, 
added to Senator Kenna’s statement: 
 [If] a man who merely by superior skill and intelligence, a 
breeder of horses or raiser of cattle, or manufacturer or artisan 
of any kind, got the whole business because nobody could do 
it as well as he could was not a monopolist, [unless] it 
involved something like the use . . . [of improper] 
competition, like the engrossing, the buying up of all other 
persons engaged in the same business.”'19 
Clearly the context was the acquisition of monopoly through pure 
product superiority without an exclusionary practice. 
 
1715 U.S.C. §18. 
18 21 Cong. Rec. 3151-3152 (1890). 
19Id., 3152.  The legislative is thoroughly discussed in Robert H. Lande, 
Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: the 
Efficiency interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (finding 
predominant concern with high consumer prices); Robert H. Bork, 
Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & ECON. 7 
(1966) (finding predominant concern with economic efficiency). 
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By contrast, in defending the Robinson-Patman Act four 
decades later, Representative Wright Patman of Texas argued that “it 
is one of the first duties of government to protect the weak against 
the strong and prevent men from injuring one another,” and that 
“greed should be restrained and the Golden Rule practiced.”20 
 The legislative history of the 1950 (Celler-Kefauver) 
amendments to the merger statute is more protective of small 
business, but it also never refers to situations in which a merger 
might cause actual competitive harm requiring a welfare tradeoff.21  
The closest it comes is an inquiry by Senator Estes Kefauver from 
Tennessee concerning a merger between two newspapers that 
combined “in order to save the expense of operating in two separate 
buildings.” Senator Herbert O'Conor of Maryland replied that the 
merger would not be unlawful. “It may well be that by effecting a 
better arrangement for a more profitable undertaking in the manner 
described, competition would be stimulated rather than lessened.”11  
There is also a statement in the House Committee Report stating that 
the statute was not intended to prohibit mergers between two small 
firms that enabled them to compete more effectively with larger 
ones.22 
 None of the discussions in the debates or other legislative 
history refer to situations where conduct caused actual competitive 
harm that might require proof of an offsetting welfare tradeoff.  The 
first set of Merger Guidelines, issued by the Department of Justice in 
1968, rejected an efficiency defense, even though these Guidelines 
would have condemned mergers under far smaller market shares than 
we do today.23 The Guidelines’ statement recognized economies of 
 
2080 Cong. Rec. 3447 (1936). 
21Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21. 
1196 Cong. Rec. 16456 (1950) (statements of Senators Kefauver and 
O'Conor). 
22See H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).  
23 Dept. of Justice, 1968 Merger Guidelines, available at 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1968-merger-guidelines. 
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scale as the only relevant efficiency, and concluded that the given 
standards would not normally apply to firms so small that they could 
achieve greater efficiency through merger.24 While the 1982 revision 
of the Guidelines took efficiencies more seriously, they also refused 
to consider “a claim of specific efficiencies as a mitigating factor for 
a merger that would otherwise be challenged.”25 
Subsequent editions of the merger Guidelines culminating 
with the current ones all acknowledge an efficiency defense, although 
with strict proof requirements.26  Further, the defense consistently 
refuses to engage in a welfare tradeoff.  Rather, under the current 
(2010) Guidelines the efficiency must be shown to be so substantial 
that the merger “is not likely to be anticompetitive in any relevant 
market.”  This means essentially that the efficiency must be large 
enough to reverse completely any upward price effects resulting from 
the merger, so that the predicted post-merger price is no higher than 
the pre-merger price.27  In that case, there is nothing to trade off. The 
 
24Id.  The 1968 Guidelines’ complete statement on economies is: 
 
§10.  Economies.  Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the 
Department will not accept as a justification for an acquisition 
normally subject to challenge under its horizontal merger standards 
the claim that the merger will produce economies (i.e., 
improvements in efficiency) because, among other reasons, (i) the 
Department's adherence to the standards will usually result in no 
challenge being made to mergers of the kind most likely to involve 
companies operating significantly below the size necessary to 
achieve significant economies of scale; (ii) where substantial 
economies are potentially available to a firm, they can normally be 
realized through internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are 
severe difficulties in accurately establishing the existence and 
magnitude of economies claimed for a merger. 
25Dept. of Justice,  1982 Merger Guidelines §V.1.A., available at 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-merger-guidelines.  
26 The Antitrust Division maintains archival copies of all editions of the 
merger guidelines through the current ones.  See USDOJ.gov. 
27Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines, §10, available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-
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2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines deal with efficiencies mainly by 
incorporating the relevant discussions from the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines.28 
Producer Profits as Consumer Welfare 
 One of the perverse features of the Bork welfare tradeoff 
model is that, while he renamed it “consumer welfare,” it counted 
increased producer profits as an element of that consumer welfare.  
As a result, mergers such as the one illustrated in Bork’s figure 
presented above could be said to further consumer welfare even 
though they produced significantly lower output and higher prices. 
When coupled with Bork’s view that efficiencies cannot be measured 
in individual cases,29 it meant that decision makers could convince 
themselves that they were protecting “consumer welfare” when the 
practice in question harmed actual consumers as consumers, provided 
that it increased the seller’s profits by even more.  This view of 
consumer welfare has haunted antitrust policy ever since.30 
 One rationale for counting producer profits as part of 
“consumer” welfare is the belief that profits eventually get competed 
away and the benefits go to consumers.  In a world in which markets 
moved more-or-less consistently toward a competitive equilibrium 
that might be true, and that was in fact the assumption of many 
Chicago School economists – namely, that the model of competition 
would triumph. Market imperfections are merely ephemeral hiccups 
and profits will induce competitive entry.  In that case, the argument 
 
guidelines-08192010#10.  For analysis, see 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶970-974 (4th ed. 2016). 
28Dept. of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Vertical Merger 
Guidelines (2020), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/us-department-justice-
federal-trade-commission-vertical-merger-
guidelines/vertical_merger_guidelines_6-30-20.pdf.  See §6. 
29See BORK, PARADOX, supra note ___ at 126 (problem of measuring 
efficiencies is “utterly insoluble”). 
30See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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goes, ultimately consumers will benefit even from practices the harm 
them in the short run, provided they produce sufficient profits.31 
Today it seems clear, however, that imperfect competition is 
durable, stable, and a fact of life, certainly in moderately and highly 
concentrated markets.32  Indeed, over that last three decades price-
cost margins have moved steadily upward.33  As a result, today there 
is no reason to think that the gains from higher margins resulting 
from a merger will be competed away, and good reason for thinking 
that is unlikely to happen.  Tolerating higher margins at consumers’ 
expense, trusting that competition would bring output up and benefit 
consumers in the long run would be naïve and irresponsible. 
 Nevertheless, the total welfare approach that Bork proposed 
has managed to evoke a great deal of support because it brings profits 
to business firms.  Consumers are individually small, diverse and 
poorly organized.  Producers, by and large, are not, and for them an 
interest in high profits is a common denominator.  One thing that the 
Bork formulation offered was a rhetoric of antitrust anti-enforcement 
that could evoke consumer welfare as its rationale even as its 
decisions facilitated a great deal of consumer harm. This has emerged 
as one of the most significant instances of special interest capture in 
any area of law. 
Identifying Antitrust Harm 
 The federal antitrust laws speak in economic terms about the 
harms that they prohibit.  The Sherman Act is directed toward 
 
31See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, __ 
BOSTON UNIV. L. REV. (2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3508832.  
32Ibid. 
33See Jan De Loecker, Jan Eeckhout, & Gabriel Unger, The Rise of Market 
Power and the Macroeconomic Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON. 561 (2020); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens 
of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
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conduct that “restrains trade” or “monopolizes” markets.34  The 
Clayton Act prohibits conduct whose effect may be substantially to 
“lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly.”35  Even so, 
economic harm can be measured in different ways. While no measure 
is without its faults, antitrust’s dominant concern with the 
preservation of competitive markets seems well justified. A 
competitive market is one in which output is as high and prices as 
low as are consistent with sustainable competition.  High output 
benefits not only consumers, but also suppliers, including those who 
supply labor.  In general, these groups are better off as output is 
higher and prices lower.  To be sure, not every interest group is better 
off, competitors in particular.  While competitive markets give them 
their own chance to expand, those who lose out will be injured as 
their rivals become bigger and more efficient. 
 This leads to some questions.  First, if high sustainable output 
is the goal, how should we measure it?  Second, are there situations 
in which antitrust should prefer lower output alternatives in order to 
benefit some particular interest group, such as labor, competitors, or 
others? 
 
Measuring Relevant Output 
 Output is not necessarily easy to measure.  In its simplest 
form it refers to the number of identical units of something that a 
firm produces.  Measuring output in that case requires little more 
than counting.  It may also require some basic understanding of 
production and its costs. 
 
3415 U.S.C. §1 (prohibiting contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in 
restraint of trade); 15 U.S.C. §2 (prohibiting those who monopolize or 
attempt to monopolize commerce). 
35All three substantive antitrust sections of the Clayton Act prohibit the 
conduct they cover when it threatens to “substantially … lessen competition 
or tend to create a monopoly.”  See 15 U.S.C. §13 (price discrimination); 15 
U.S.C. §14 (tying and exclusive dealing); 15 U.S.C. §18 (mergers). 
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 Measuring “sustainable” output can require a dig into a firm’s 
cost structure.  In order for output to be sustainable the seller must 
earn enough to cover its costs, earning at least a competitive rate of 
return.  Different costs affect output in different ways. One widely 
misunderstood example of how costs affect output and pricing is the 
Amazon eBooks case,36 in which the Justice Department successfully 
prosecuted a cartel of book publishers organized by Apple in order to 
force Amazon to increase eBook prices.  Critics of that decision 
observed that Amazon’s aggressive pricing of eBooks hurt traditional 
book sellers, which was true.  The attackers also claimed predatory 
pricing, which was almost certainly not true under existing law.37 
 Traditional book publishing has a fairly conventional mixture 
of fixed and variable costs.  Acquisition and design costs are largely 
fixed.  They do not change as the number of copies increases or 
decreases.  Production costs, including materials, are largely variable, 
except for the production equipment itself. Depending on the nature 
of the agreement with the author, another variable cost is royalties.  
In a traditional royalty agreement paying the author, say, 10% of the 
sales price, that cost is variable: each additional sale incurs this cost.  
By contrast, if the author is paid a flat rate – say a one time payment 
of $25,000 – then the royalty is a fixed cost. 
Just as so much digital output, the eBook introduced a 
product for which nearly all costs other than electronic distribution 
and royalties were fixed.  That includes all of the costs of creating an 
ebook, such as manuscript acquisition, editing, formatting, and 
production.  These are incurred at the front end and do not vary with 
the number of books that are sold.  The ebook largely eliminated 
 
36United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S.Ct. 1376 (2016). 
37E.g., Carl T. Bogus, Books and Olive Oil: Why Antitrust Must Deal With 
Consolidated Corporate Power, 52 MICH. J.L. REFORM 265 (2019); Guy A. 
Rub, Amazon and the New World of Publishing, 14 J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. 
SOC’Y 367 (2018); Jared Killeen, Throwing the E-Book at Publishers: what 
the Apple Case Tells Us About Antitrust Law, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 341 (2013). 
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conventional production, shipping and inventory costs.  One 
remaining variable cost is the very small cost of electronic 
distribution, which covers the processing of orders and transmitting 
the electronic file to the customer.  Another is percentage royalty 
costs.   
In a competitive equilibrium prices are driven toward 
marginal cost, which consists of variable costs.  This means that 
under competition the price of an ebook would be reduced to little 
more than distribution and royalty costs. Because books are highly 
differentiated and protected from copying, one would expect the real 
world price to be higher than that. That is, pricing behavior would 
resemble monopolistic competition more than perfect competition.38 
To the extent individual customers preferred one title over another 
and were willing to pay more, prices would be above marginal cost.39 
These facts are borne out by examining the price of classic 
books that have been digitized and for which copyright has expired.  
As a result, no royalty is due, copying is free and easy, and the 
market comes closer to perfect competition.  For many of these the 
price is zero, both on Amazon as well as other sellers.40  By contrast, 
 
38 Monopolistic competition assumes product differentiation but free entry.  
By contrast, the copyright laws lead to product differentiation but 
restrictions on copying.  This will lead to prices higher than marginal cost.  
For a good analysis of the industry, see Marcel Canoy, Jan C. Van Ours, 
and Frederick Van Der Ploeg, The Economics of Books 722, in 1 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF ART AND CULTURE (Victor A. 
Ginsburg & David Throsby, eds., 2006). 
39See Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic 
Competition, 43 REV. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976). 
40For example, at a price of zero an Amazon customer can purchase F. 
SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY; VIRGINIA WOOLF, THE 
COMPLETE WORKS; WALT WHITMAN, LEAVES OF GRASS; CHARLES 
DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES; and hundreds of others.  They can also 
be obtained at a price of zero from other sources, such as Project Gutenberg 
(www.gutenberg.org); Free-eBooks (free-ebooks.net); Open Library 
(openlibrary.org). 
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books that are under copyright almost always sell at positive prices, 
although often less than the same title in a traditional format. 
 Given these significant cost differences, simply observing that 
Amazon sells ebooks for less money than the same books in hard or 
soft covers tells us nothing.  Further, it is not antitrust’s job to make 
any kind of preemptive decision excluding ebooks, or preferring a 
particular publishing format or technology. While antitrust policy has 
a powerful role in limiting restraints on innovation, it has no power 
to limit innovations simply because they injure firms dedicated to 
older technology. Nor does it attempt to limit firms from pricing 
efficiently under the cost structure that their new technology 
facilitates.  Ultimately the market will determine the place of ebooks 
in the general book market, and here the jury is still out.41  
Differentiation applies not only to different titles, but also to different 
technologies.  Consumer preferences being what they are, there will 
likely always be a place for both traditional and electronic books. 
“Output” for antitrust purposes may also refer to quality or 
variety as opposed to numerical units, and these can be very difficult 
to measure.42 Antitrust is not often saddled with the task of 
measuring quality or variety directly, however, but only with 
determining whether a particular practice restrains quality or variety 
unreasonably.  This is one critical difference between antitrust and 
sector specific regulation.  For example, the United States 
Department of Agriculture is empowered to set grading standards for 
 
41 See, e.g., About eBooks, available at https://about.ebooks.com/ebook-
industry-news-feed/ (ebooks accounted for about 19% of 2020 books sales 
by revenue, and 36% by units – suggesting that the price of the average 
ebook is about ½ the price of an average traditional book; Amazon’s share 
of ebooks is about 67%). 
42See, e.g., Susan J. Devlin, H.K. Dong, and Marbue Brown, Selecting a 
Scale for Measuring Quality, 5 MARKETING RES. 12 (1993); Carol L. 
Karnes, Sri V. Sridharan, and John J. Kanet, Measuring Quality from the 
Consumer’s Perspective: A Methodology and its Application, 39 INT’L J. 
PRODUCTION ECON. 215 (1995). 
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agricultural products.43  The antitrust laws do not “grade” products or 
make substantive quality determination.  However, they do 
frequently intervene when non-public grading entities do so 
anticompetitively. 
  For example, if competitors agree with one another to use an 
inferior product,44 to exclude certain types or producers of a 
service,45 or to resist development of a certain technology,46 the court 
need not make its own judgment whether one version or the other is 
of higher quality.  Its function is not to set the standard, but only to 
ensure that the standard has been set by competitive market forces to 
the extent this is possible. 
For example, the restraint that was challenged in the Allied 
Tube case was the defendant’s collective exclusion of newly 
introduced PVC (plastic) electrical conduit, which competed with the 
defendant’s well established steel conduit.47  In evaluating that 
agreement the court did not need to decide that PVC conduit was 
superior – the market ultimately made that decision -- but only that 
the agreement interfered with free market forces.  This is generally 
true of antitrust rules evaluating standard setting, where courts try to 
avoid passing judgment on the substance of the standard.  Rather, 
 
43 7 U.S.C. §§1621 et seq.  See, e.g., 7 CFR, Part 53 (livestock grades). 
44E.g., Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965) 
(condemning pasta producers’ agreement to use cheaper farina wheat rather 
than durum semolina wheat in their products). 
45E.g., Wilk v. American Medical Assn., 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(condemning AMA rules excluding chiropractors from parts of medical 
practice).  See also North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. 
FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015) (similar; teeth whitening by nondentists, who 
charged less). 
46Automobile Mfrs. Assn. v. GM Corp., 307 F.Supp. 617 (C.D.Cal. 1969) 
(approving consent decree prohibiting automobile manufacturers from 
agreeing to restrain development of air pollution control equipment). 
47 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988) 
(defendant’s used standard setting organization to boycott cheaper and 
superior electric conduit product). 
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they examine the structure of the standard-setting organization and 
the process by which the standard was achieved.48 
For example, antitrust court’s are rightfully suspicious of 
situations where the people passing judgment on a standard are 
competitors of the person who is being excluded and there are not 
adequate procedural protections in place.  That was true in AMA v. 
Wilk, Allied Tube, and the North Carolina Dental case.49 For 
example, in Allied Tube the defendant, a competitor of the plaintiff, 
packed a standard setting meeting with a large number of voting 
members who were instructed to ignore the merits and simply vote 
against the plaintiff’s product.50 
 If the standard setters are not competitors, an antitrust 
objection is more difficult to find.  This is fundamentally a structural 
inquiry.  For example, in Moore v. Boating Industry the court 
approved the Boating Industry’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s 
submersible boat trailer light, observing that the trade association did 
not compete with the plaintiff.51  Its members consisted of trailer 
manufacturers who were purchasers rather than producers of trailer 
lights.  As a result, they would have no incentive to condemn a 
superior light but every reason to exclude one that was dangerous.52 
A restraint such as the one in Allied Tube operates as a 
limitation on variety as well as innovation.  The antitrust issue in the 
case was not whether the plaintiff’s PVC conduit would exclude steel 
conduit in construction codes, but whether PVC conduit could be 
 
48See 13 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶2230-2232 (4th ed. 
2019). 
49Wilk v. American Medical Assn., 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990); Allied 
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); North 
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 (2015). 
50 See the lower court’s opinion: Allied Tube, 817 F.2d 938, 947 (2d Cir. 
1987) (noting jury finding that Allied Tube recruited 230 people to pack a 
standard setting meeting, with neither the knowledge or inclination to vote 
favorably). 
51 Moore v. Boating Indus. Assns,, 819 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1987). 
52 Id. at 703. 
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used as an alternative in addition to steel conduit.  After that, both 
could be offered, and the market could decide whether one or both 
would survive. Once again, antitrust’s purpose is not to make 
substantive decisions about variety, but only to let the market be free 
to do its work.  In Wilk v. AMA the Seventh Circuit held that the 
AMA violated the antitrust laws by enforcing accreditation rules that 
largely excluded chiropractors from important parts of the health care 
market, including accredited hospitals.53 While the AMA certainly 
had authority to exclude dangerous medical procedures it could not 
limit the variety of procedures so as to exclude a practice that many 
consumers had come to believe were beneficial.  From that point, the 
market could determine the place of chiropractic in health care.  In 
decisions such as Wilk, limitations on variety are really little more 
than efforts to exclude lower cost alternatives.  That was also true in 
the North Carolina Dental decision, which struck down a dental 
board’s rule that prevented non-dentists such as hygienists or 
cosmetologists from whitening teeth.54 
Even in cases where output is measured in simple units, 
inferences can be drawn from the restraint itself.  One example is the 
Amex case, which involved an unsuccessful antitrust challenge to a 
credit card anti-steering rule.55  Because AmEx charged higher 
merchant fees than rival credit cards charged, merchants had an 
incentive to “steer” customer by offering them a price break or some 
other service in exchange for the customer’s use of a cheaper card.  
For example, if the Amex merchant fee on a large purchase was $30 
while the fee for using a Visa card was only $20, the merchant might 
offer the customer a $5 discount or other benefit to use the Visa card 
instead.  The customer might accept or decline this offer, depending 
on whether the incremental benefits she received from using the 
Amex card were worth more than $5.  The customer’s acceptance of 
 
53 Wilk v. American Medical Assn., 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1990). 
54North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494 
(2015). 
55Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018). 
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that offer would benefit both the merchant and the customer, but the 
no-steering rule prevented the merchant from making this offer.56 
The steering exchange was a Pareto superior deal that the 
anti-steering rule prevented.  To be sure, it benefitted Amex, who 
was able to preserve a transaction that harmed both its customer and 
its merchant, as well as Visa, the competing platform that was denied 
a profitable sale.  That unfavorable deal alone was enough to provide 
robust support for the inference that the anti-steering rule reduced 
output, which is an inference drawn from the higher prices. 
 The most difficult output to measure is innovation.  Once 
again, however, antitrust rarely needs to measure innovation as such.  
Rather it needs to consider whether a particular practice restrains 
innovation unreasonably. For example, consider Microsoft’s pressure 
on Intel to refrain from developing the “JAVA-enabled” 
microprocessor chip, which could process multiple code languages.  
The chip was intended to enable Microsoft’s competitors to offer 
superior products.57  In order to condemn this restraint the court did 
not need to determine that the JAVA-enabled chip was superior to 
Microsoft’s existing technology, and it certainly did not have to 
quantify the value of any additional capabilities that the JAVA-
enabled chip might produce.  Rather, it needed only to determine that 
Microsoft was imposing a restraint that interfered with Intel’s efforts 
to develop such a chip.  This prevented the excluded product from 
having a fair chance in the marketplace. 
 One policy obstacle to the achievement of competitive 
markets is the fact that competition itself is a public good, 
particularly where consumers and labor are concerned.  Consumers 
are individually small, not well organized, and have diverse tastes 
and preferences.  Labor is much more poorly organized today than it 
was two generations ago, and this shows up in its declining share of 
 
56 See Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason, supra note __ at 43-
44. 
57United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 77-78 (D.C.Cir. 2001) 
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productive output.58  By contrast, large firms with high margins have 
been able to speak to policy makers with a single voice in pursuit of 
profits.  As a result, both consumers and labor have lost out in many 
policy battles since the 1980s, and underdeterrent antitrust policy has 
often been a facilitator.59 
 
Alternatives to Output as a Criterion of Antitrust Harm 
 
 A second question concerning the definition of antitrust harm 
as reduced output is whether there should be exceptions?  Should 
antitrust law makers sometimes prefer a solution likely to reduce 
output and raise prices simply because it benefits a particular interest 
group?  For example, should it do more about the declining position 
of labor in the economy?  As noted, an antitrust policy of favoring 
expanded output generally benefits labor, which profits as greater 
production creates more job opportunities. Mergers that suppress 
competition in the labor market are output reducing, just as much as 
mergers that suppress competition in product markets. The protection 
of labor should have a greater role in merger policy than it currently 
does.60 In addition, antitrust currently prohibits anti-poaching 
 
58See, e.g., David Autor, et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of 
Superstar Firms (NBER, May, 2017), available at 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23396/w23396.pdf.  
See also Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares, 75 J. FIN. 
2421 (2020); James Manyika, et. al., A New Look at the Declining Labor 
Share of Income in the United States (McKinsey, 2019), available at 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-growth/a-
new-look-at-the-declining-labor-share-of-income-in-the-united-states#.   
59See Herbert Hovenkamp and Fiona M. Scott Morton, Framing the 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 168 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1843 (2020).  
60See Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers 
in Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J.1031 (2019). 
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agreements or other collusive activity targeting labor.61  Doing these 
things does not require a departure from antitrust’s general mandate 
to expand output. 
Beyond that, antitrust policy might conceivably do things that 
tend to reduce output or whose goals are not related to competitive 
output expansion.  These might include guaranteed minimum wages, 
better working conditions, freedom from discrimination or 
harassment, job security, or collective bargaining rights.  While these 
are all important goals, however, they are not antitrust goals.  There 
is no sensible way to include them in the competition-enforcing 
language of the antitrust laws.  Judges asked to do so would be at sea.  
Like most regulatory goals, they require a degree of legislative or 
administrative specificity that the antitrust concern for competitive 
markets does not capture.  Even if we agree that these other policies 
are imperfect, antitrust has neither the mandate nor the toolbox it 
would need to rule the world. 
This issue of concern beyond competitive output is also 
relevant to discussions about large digital platforms such as Amazon, 
Apple, Facebook, and Google.  Many regard them as too big, too 
politically powerful or biased, too casual or greedy with private 
information, or abusive in some other way.62  Unless that harm is 
related to an output reduction, however, it is untethered from the 
antitrust laws. Antitrust was never intended to control the universe, 
its statutes do not hint of that, or create any kind of manual for doing 
so. Excessive private political power, theft of information or 
intellectual property rights, and the destruction of main street could 
all be cognizable harms worthy of legal attention.  But antitrust is not 
the appropriate vehicle, unless the harm in question is a consequence 
of an anticompetitive output reduction. 
 
61See, e.g., In re Railway Indus. Employee No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 
F.Supp.3d 464 (W. D. Pa. 2019); Butler v. Jimmy John’s Franchise, LLC, 
331 F.Supp.3d 786 (S. D. Il. 2018). 
62 E.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, BREAK ‘EM UP: RECOVERING OUR FREEDOM 
FROM BIG AG, BIG TECH, AND BIG MONEY (2020). 
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The round of antitrust complaints filed by federal and state 
enforcers late in 2020 are consistent with this definition.63  They do 
not seek to break up either Google or Facebook on the simple theory 
that they are too large.  Rather, they target specific exclusionary 
practices or, in the case of Facebook, some anticompetitive 
acquisitions.  The requested relief is quite consistent with antitrust’s 
general goal of preserving large output and low prices.64 
 Antitrust policy has the difficult job of threading the needle 
between two extremes.65  On one side are those that overvalue 
producer profits while understating the value of high output for 
consumers and labor. On the other side are those who rightfully 
acknowledge that problems of monopoly exist, but who would 
correct them by injecting small business protectionism, concerns 
about large size or political power, or other noneconomic goals into 
the domain of antitrust. 
 Consider a statement released by the Biden-Sanders Unity 
Task Force in July, 2020, which speaks about the need for greater 
antitrust enforcement in several areas.66  It expresses concern about 
health care mergers that raise price, an acknowledged problem that 
clearly falls within the consumer welfare principle.67 It does the same 
thing for anticompetitive outcomes in agricultural processing.68  It 
would also “Charge antitrust regulators with systematically 
incorporating broader criteria into their analytical considerations, 
including in particular the impact of corporate consolidation on the 
 
63See Compl., United States v. Google, LLC (1:20-cv-03010, D.D.C., Oct. 
20, 2020); Compl., Colorado v. Google, #_____ (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2020); 
Compl.,  FTC v. Facebook, Inc. #___ (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020). 
64 For analysis, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 
130 YALE L.J. (2021), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3639142.  
65 See Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis, supra note __. 
66Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations (July 8, 2020), 
available at https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/UNITY-
TASK-FORCE-RECOMMENDATIONS.pdf. 
67 Id. at 33. 
68Id. at 52, 68. 
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labor market, underserved communities, and racial equity.”69  It also 
speaks of using the antitrust laws to reverse the impact of Trump-
administration mergers “to repair the damage done to working people 
and to reverse the impact on racial inequity.”70 
 
 By contrast, a dissenting report to the Democrat-controlled 
House Judiciary Committee’s statement on platforms disagrees with 
the majority about many issues, but it shares the concern that 
something must be done about big tech.  In particular, however, it 
laments that big tech “has used its monopolistic position in the 
marketplace to censor speech,” and to exercise “overt bias against 
conservative outlets and personalities.”71 
 
 All of these concerns expressed by both sides are important 
goals for legal and economic policy generally.  Some are even 
commendable as antitrust goals.  Attaining more competitive markets 
can address some problems in health care, agricultural processing, 
and labor to the extent that antitrust is capable of doing so.  Even the 
impact on things such as equality could be justifiable depending on 
how it is interpreted. Competitive markets should be 
 
69Id. at 67. 
70Id. at 74. 
71Representative Ken Buck, The Third Way, House Judiciary Committee 6 
(2020), available at 
https://buck.house.gov/sites/buck.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/Buck
%20Report.pdf.  More specifically, the Buck Report claims: 
Notably, Google used its dominant advertising technology product 
to demonetize conservative media outlets, including The Federalist. 
YouTube, a Google subsidiary, blocked videos from Republican 
politicians and media groups. Amazon censored conservative 
organizations, including the Family Research Council and the 
Alliance Defending Freedom by blocking Americans’ ability to 
donate to these groups through the AmazonSmile tool. Facebook’s 
algorithms, advertising policies, and content moderation rules have 
all combined to discriminate against conservative viewpoints, 
shadow ban conservative organizations and individuals, and 
suppress political speech. The majority also left Twitter and its 
suppression of speech out of the investigation completely. 
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nondiscriminatory, and discrimination is bad to the extent it results in 
the rejection of free entry and choice based on economic criteria.  
More competitive markets are conducive to free speech to the extent 
that they create alternative channels of communication. 
 
 Nevertheless, antitrust policy, in contrast to legal policy 
generally, is not the appropriate tool for pursuing particular goals of 
social equality or free speech at the expense of competition.  For 
example, while affirmative action is an essential policy goal in many 
areas, antitrust policy administered by the courts under the now 
existing antitrust laws is not the proper vehicle for achieving it. 
 
Ideological exclusion in dominated markets is a problem for 
speech doctrine in communications. It should also be an antitrust 
problem because diversity of viewpoints is part of the quality and 
variety of output that antitrust should encourage.72 Here, the Federal 
Communications Commission reviews mergers that involve the 
transfer of telecommunications licenses under a “public interest” test 
that can include affect on the diversity of viewpoints.73  If no such 
license transfer is involved, then the merger is viewed only under the 
antitrust laws.  Antitrust has frankly done an inadequate job of 
protecting consumers’ right to a diversity of viewpoints, and the 
FCC’s public interest standard is too vague to be reliable.74 
 
 The antitrust laws’ spare language provides an elastic 
mandate and is directed to the courts. This gives the antitrust statutes 
great flexibility, and complaints to the effect that they are “outdated” 
 
72See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: 
Can Merger Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371 
(2006); and see Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and 
Media Consolidation: An Empirical Study, 61 STAN. L. REV. 781 (2009). 
73See 47 U.S.C. §214(a),(c).  See also  Christopher S. Yoo, Merger Review 
by the Federal Trade Commission, 45 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295 (2014); Jon 
Sallet, FCC Transaction Review: Competition and the Public Interest, FCC 
(Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2014/08/12/fcc-
transaction-review-competition-and-public-interest#fn3 . 
74See Trey O-Callaghan, Unprotected and Unpersuaded: The FCC’s 
Flawed Merger Review Procedures, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 39 (2016). 
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are wrongheaded.75 However, this elasticity also creates a danger that 
they can be used to achieve goals through the judicial system that are 
more difficult to achieve legislatively. While the language of the 
antitrust laws sweeps broadly, it is nevertheless limited to concerns 
for economic competition. 
Consumer Welfare, Prices, and Labor 
 Many descriptions of antitrust’s goals of furthering consumer 
welfare refer to prices: the goal of antitrust should be to combat 
monopolistic prices.  While that is true, articulating the goal in this 
way raises conceptual problems when we think about suppliers, labor 
or others involved in production.  For example, the antitrust concern 
with labor is with wage suppression, which means that wages are 
anticompetitively low.76  This is true of monopsony, or buy side, 
restraints generally. This seems inconsistent with an antitrust 
insistence on low prices.  It can also fuel a common misperception, 
which is that low wages or suppressed input pries naturally lead to 
low consumer prices. 
 One thing that buyers and sellers have in common, however, 
is that both are injured by anticompetitive output reductions. While 
monopoly involves prices that are too high and monopsony involves 
prices that are too low, both result in lower output.  As a result, when 
consumer welfare is articulated in terms of output rather than price, it 
protects both buyers and sellers, including sellers of their labor. 
When wage suppression is an act of monopsony it is likely to 
raise output prices in the product market and almost certainly will not 
lower them. While that result might seem counterintuitive, it is 
actually robust, and results from the fact that the firm with monopoly 
power over laborers uses less labor and thus will produce less as 
 
75E.g., Tara Lachapelle, 100-Year-Old Antitrust Laws are no Match for Big 
Tech, Bloomberg (Aug. 4, 2020), available at 
https://www.bloombergquint.com/gadfly/-5-trillion-data-hogs-amazon-
apple-facebook-and-google-need-better-policing.  
76E.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 
YALE L.J. 2078, 2080 (2018). 
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well.  In the unlikely event that firm is a perfect competitor in the 
product market it will simply sell less, although at the same price.  In 
the more common case where it also has market power in the product 
market, its prices there will go up even as wages go down.77 The 
basic theory is clear and uncontroversial. 
Antitrust policy has a very important but circumscribed role 
in protecting worker welfare, which is to ensure that product output, 
and thus job opportunities, are as large as is consistent with the 
maintenance of competitive markets.  While that is a good thing, it is 
hardly a recipe for fixing all of labor problems.  As noted earlier, 
antitrust law is not a good device for setting minimum wages, for 
regulating working conditions and occupational safety, protecting 
pensions or ensuring retirement security, protecting workers from 
discrimination or harassment in the workplace, or other things related 
to worker welfare.  This is just another way of saying that antitrust’s 
purpose is not to swallow up all of legal policy respecting labor. 
There are other reasons for preferring output rather than price 
as the primary indicator of consumer welfare.  Firms almost always 
have more control over output than they do over price.  This is most 
true in competitive markets, and less true as markets are more 
monopolized.  A seller in a perfectly competitive market lacks any 
control over price but almost always controls its own output.  For 
example, a corn farmer cannot meaningfully ask “what price should I 
charge” for this year’s crop.  She will charge the market price.  While 
she has the power to charge less, she has no incentive to do so 
because she can sell all she produces at the market price.  The one 
absolute power she does have, however, is to determine output 
 
77See ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 48 (2010); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §1.2b (6th ed. 2020).  
On the impact of mergers that are anticompetitive in labor markets, see 
Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in 
Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J.1031 (2019), 
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consistent with her own needs for profit.  The decision whether to 
plant 1000 acres in corn, 500, 100 acres or even zero is entirely hers. 
 The consumer welfare principle in antitrust pursues maximum 
output consistent with sustainable competition.  In a competitive 
market this occurs when prices equal marginal cost and are sufficient 
to cover fixed costs as well.  More practically and in real world 
markets, the principle tries to define and identify anticompetitive 
practices as ones that reduce market wide output below the 
competitive level. To be sure, output can sometimes go higher than 
the competitive level, but this would require that at least some prices 
be below cost.  This can happen, for example, during periods of 
anticompetitive predatory pricing.78  As a result, the definition refers 
to “sustainable” but competitive levels of output.  If output is too 
high, some firms will be losing money and must eventually raise their 
prices or exit. 
 Consumer welfare measured as output serves the customer’s 
interest in low prices and also in markets that produce as wide a 
variety of goods and services as competition can offer.  It also serves 
the interest of labor, which is best off when production is highest.  
Concurrently, it benefits input suppliers and other participants in the 
market process.  For example, if the output of toasters increases, 
consumers benefit from the lower prices.  Labor benefits because 
more toaster production increases the demand for labor.  Retailers, 
suppliers of electric components, shipping companies, taxing 
authorities and virtually everyone with a stake in the production of 
toasters benefits as well. 
 Antitrust is a microeconomic discipline, concerned with the 
performance of individual markets rather than the economy as a 
whole.  Nevertheless, high output in a particular market contributes 
to a well-functioning overall economy.  Macroeconomic measures 
such as GDP are based on the aggregate production of goods and 
 
78See 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶¶724-726 (4th ed. 2015). 
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services in the entire economy under consideration.  All else being 
equal, when a particular good or service market experiences larger 
competitive output the overall economy will benefit as well.79  That 
issue is almost never relevant in any particular antitrust case, but it 
can be important at the legislative or policy level.  Increasingly 
people have observed a link between competition policy – 
particularly high price-cost margins – and the performance of the 
economy as a whole.80 
 If antitrust is faithful to its concern for competitive markets, 
then what lies outside of its boundaries?  First, bigness itself is not an 
antitrust issue unless it leads to reduced output in some market.  That 
is, the consumer welfare principle is consistent with large firms.  It 
favors economies of scale and scope, provided that the overall 
structure of the market is competitive.81  To be sure, very large firms 
can injure small firms that have higher costs or lower quality 
products. 
The impact of the consumer welfare principle on small firms 
is complex, however, and requires close analysis of individual cases.  
 
79 For a good discussion, see JOHN BELLAMY FOSTER AND ROBERT W. 
MCCHESNEY, THE ENDLESS CRISIS: HOW MONOPOLY-FINANCE CAPITAL 
PRODUCES STAGNATION AND UPHEAVAL FROM THE USA TO CHINA 
(2017). 
80For good commentary, see Jonathan B. Baker, Overlapping Financial 
Investor Ownership, Market Power, and Antitrust Enforcement: My 
Qualified Agreement with Professor Elhauge, 129 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 
212, 219-225 (2016); Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Letivin, Considering Law 
and Macroeconomics, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. i (2020); Chad Syverson, 
Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open 
Questions, 33 J. ECON. PERSP. 23 (2019); Tay-Cheng Ma, Antitrust and 
Democracy: Perspectives from Efficiency and Equity, 12 J. COMP. L. & 
ECON. 233 (2016). 
81 An economy of scale is a cost that declines as a firm produces a larger 
amount.  An economy of scope is a cost that declines as someone produces 
a larger variety of products, or in a larger number of places.  For example, 
because of joint costs a firm might be able to produce toasters and space 
heaters out of the same plant more cheaply than two firms that each 
produced one of the two products. 
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While small competitors of a large, low cost firm can be injured, 
many other small firms benefit, including suppliers and retailers. A 
good illustration of this complexity is Amazon, which is a very large 
retailer that generally sells at low prices and has maintained high 
consumer satisfaction.82 Amazon has undoubtedly injured many 
small firms forced to compete with its prices and distribution.  At the 
same time, however, Amazon acts as broker, or distributor, for 
millions of small firms who use its retail fulfillment services.83  In 
addition, when a very large firm produces more, it creates 
opportunities for other firms that sell complements, that distribute the 
products that a large firm produces, or that supply it with inputs.  So 
once again it is important not to paint with too broad a brush.  
Blowing up Amazon would very likely injure more small businesses 
than it would help.  That does not mean, however, that antitrust is 
powerless.  Amazon may be using anticompetitive agreements with 
vendors or other trading partners to enhance its own position, and 
these could be enjoined under the antitrust laws.84 
 As for labor and antitrust, that relationship is also complex 
and has changed over time.  During the early years of Sherman Act 
enforcement organized labor was widely believed to be a source of 
monopoly.  Many of the earliest antitrust criminal prosecutions were 
directed at labor unions.85  Labor organizer Eugene Debs went to 
 
82See Jon Markman, How Amazon.com Remains the Ruler of Retail, 
FORBES (Jan. 30, 2020) (Amazon #1 in consumer satisfaction for three 
consecutive years). 
83For statistics, see https://www.feedbackexpress.com/amazon-1029528-
new-sellers-year-plus-
stats/#:~:text=Amazon%20US%20stats,and%20more%20than%2060%20c
ountries. (last visited July 20, 2020) (noting that Amazon has 5 million 
independent sellers, with 1.7 million currently listing products for sale). 
84 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Platform Monopoly, 130 Yale 
L.J. (2021) (forthcoming), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3639142.  
85See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies in American Law, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988). 
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prison in 1895 as a result of a conviction under the Sherman Act.86  
Congress came to labor’s rescue twice, once in §6 of the Clayton Act, 
passed in 1914,87 and then again during the New Deal.88 The result 
was the development of an antitrust immunity for organized labor 
that today protects most collective bargaining agreements and 
reaches even agreements among employers, provided that they are 
part of the collective bargaining process.89 
 But years of anti-union activity largely deprived the unions of 
the economic power and turned the tables.  Most of the antitrust 
concerns about labor today are with anticompetitive practices that 
suppress wages, not with worker power to extract higher wages.90  
Agreements among employers not to hire away one another’s 
employees (“anti-poaching” agreements) are unlawful per se91 and 
 
86See in re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 596-600 (1895) (denying habeas corpus; 
upholding Sherman Act conspiracy conviction under Congressional power 
to control railway commerce) and Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies, id. at 
920. 
8715 U.S.C. §16 (“The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article 
of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to 
forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural 
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help.”). 
88Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§101 et seq; National Labor Relations 
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§151, et. seq.; later qualified by the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 
U.S.C. 141 et seq.  See Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies, supra note __ at 
928, 929, 962. 
89Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (extending labor 
antitrust immunity to agreement among multiple NFL team owners 
involved in a multi-employer collective bargaining unit).  See 1B PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶255-257 (5th ed. 
2020). 
90See Ioana Marinescu and Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers 
in Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031 (2019); Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Competition Policy for Labour Markets, OECD Directorate for Financial 
and Enterprise Affairs (5 June 2019), available at 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2019)67/en/pdf.  See also 
Suresh Naidu, Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Antitrust Remedies for Labor 
Market Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 537 (2018). 
91See the Justice Department’s statement, “No More No-Poach: The 
Antitrust Division Continues to Investigate and Prosecute “No Poach” and 
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can even be criminal offenses.92  Today a fair amount of litigation is 
directed at overly broad use of labor noncompetition agreements, 
which are formally vertical but can be subject to antitrust attack when 
they are used by many firms in a market to impede worker mobility.  
For example, a fast food franchisor might insert a noncompetition 
agreement in each of its many contracts with franchisees, forbidding 
them from hiring away one another’s employees.93  The resulting 
limitations on labor mobility serve to keep vulnerable laborers down. 
Are there situations in which a practice that the consumer 
welfare principle would approve might nevertheless harm labor?  
Perhaps, when the practice in question reduces the demand for labor 
as a result of innovation or other cost savings in the product market 
rather than a decrease in output.  If the only two firms in a market 
merge and reduce output in the product market to monopoly levels, 
they will harm customers, but they will also suppress competition in 
the labor market.  This loss of jobs would be actionable. 
But some mergers might actually increase product market 
output while reducing the demand for labor.  Consider the merger 
 







(spring 2018).  In Jan., 2021, the Antitrust Division obtained a criminal 
indictment for labor market collusion in the market for outpatient medical 
services. See https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/health-care-company-indicted-
labor-market-collusion.   
92 See Dept. of Justice press release announcing first criminal indictment for 
an agreement among employers not to solicit one another’s higher level 
employees (Jan. 7, 2021), at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/health-care-
company-indicted-labor-market-collusion.  
93E.g., Deslandes v. McDonald’s USA, LLC, 2018 WL  3105955 (N.D. Ill. 
June 25, 2018) (parallel use of noncompetition agreements among 
McDonald’s franchsees). See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.1d (6th ed. 2020). 
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between Chrysler and Jeep, two producers of automobiles.94  The 
merger was small as automobile mergers go.  It very likely did not 
decrease automobile output and was lawful under the antitrust laws.  
Nevertheless, a likely result of such a merger would be consolidation 
of dealerships and some elimination of duplicate jobs.  As a result, 
the demand for labor might go down even as the post-merger firm’s 
automobile production went up.  For example, after the merger it is 
cheaper for Chrysler and better for consumers if Chryslers and Jeeps 
are sold through a common dealership. Sales and service can be 
performed by a common staff, reducing the number of employees to 
less than the number required by two separate facilities.95  At the 
same time, however, the overall automobile market remains 
competitive on both the consumer side and the input (labor) side.  To 
the extent this consolidation reduces Chrysler/Jeep’s costs, the firm’s 
output of automobiles would increase. 
Most consolidation-driven job reductions fail to raise antitrust 
issues.  Indeed, consolidation reduces the demand for labor even 
though the firms could not possibly injure competition in any market.  
For example, if two attorneys in New York City should form a 
partnership they might decide to share a single secretary or legal 
assistant.  A job would be eliminated, but without any competitive 
harm to any market.  So the consumer welfare principle does not 
condemn every practice that reduces the demand for labor, but only 
those practices that do so anticompetitively, by suppressing the 
 
94The acquisition, which occurred in 1987, was with American Motors, 
which at that time had already acquired Jeep. See “Chrysler is Buying 
American Motors,” NEW YORK TIMES (March 10, 1987), available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/10/business/chrysler-is-buying-
american-motors-cost-is-1.5-billion.html. 
95 The reasonableness of merger-generated labor force reductions are 
sometimes litigated under employment law.  See e.g., Mesaros v. 
FirstEnergy Corp., 2005 WL 2460739 (N.D.Oh. 2005) (rejecting age 
discrimination complaint from employee who was terminated as a result of 
merger-drive reduction in workforce); Bogart v. New York City Health and 
Hospitals Corp., 2001 WL 504874 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Coreas v. L-3 
Communic. Corp., 2012 WL 2959347 (N.D.Tex. 2012) (similar). 
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demand for labor rather than by reducing the amount of it that a firm 
needs.  It is not antitrust’s purpose to subsidize employment by 
requiring firms to use employees that they do not need.  The merger 
that reduces the demand for labor through efficient consolidation is 
no different in principle than any other production change that 
requires less labor – for example, when a manufacturer shifts from a 
labor intensive assembly process to a more automated one that 
requires fewer employees. 
 If we really wanted to protect jobs from all changes unrelated 
to product output that reduce the demand for labor we would do 
better to change the patent laws rather than antitrust law.  Changes in 
technology almost certainly have greater and more explicit effects on 
labor than do mergers or other procompetitive antitrust practices.  For 
example, a “Job Protection from Innovation Act” might provide that 
patent applications must show as a condition of patentability that 
their invention will not lead to a loss of jobs.  No one advocates for 
such a statute because its economically harmful implications are too 
clear. 
 One problem is that distinguishing pro- from anti-competitive 
reductions in labor is not always easy.  Sometimes the difference can 
be inferred from market structure.  For example, if two small firms in 
a large field merge and eliminate a certain number of duplicate jobs 
the reason is highly likely to be more efficient use of resources.  That 
would be true of the two lawyers who formed a partnership in New 
York, out of a field of thousands of competitors. As the employee-
side market share of the two firms becomes larger, however, 
anticompetitive explanations become more plausible.  Then it 
becomes necessary for a tribunal to investigate whether efficient 
consolidation or inefficient labor suppression is going on.  For 
example, if the only two hospitals in a town should merge, 
suppression of nurses’ wages is a real possibility that should be 
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investigated.96  Nevertheless, even these two hospitals might be able 
to reduce costs through efficient consolidation.  For all of these 
reasons the structural indicators used in the Merger Guidelines are a 
helpful first step.97  If applied to labor, they can help enforcers 
identify threatening levels of labor concentration that might result in 
downward pressure in wages or working conditions.98 
 Efficient changes that reduce the demand for labor typically 
result from an identifiable change in product or process design that 
explains why less labor is necessary.  For example, in the Chrysler-
Jeep merger case the post-merger firm can point to the physical 
consolidation of dealerships and elimination of duplicate jobs.  
Assessing a merger of hospitals in a concentrated market could be 
more difficult.  For example, suppose the only two hospitals in a 
community should merge and one feared consequence is suppression 
of nursing wages.  Wages may decline because the merger eliminates 
duplication, as in the Chrysler-Jeep example, but in that case there 
should be visible evidence of consolidations in operations, such as 
the use of one facility where formerly there were two. 
Antitrust Welfare in the History of Economics 
 Antitrust policy has not always articulated a consumer 
welfare principle.  However, the measurement of “welfare” has been 
a lively topic in neoclassical economics for a long time.  Most of the 
 
96Cf. United States v. Anthem, Inc., 855 F.3d 345, 371-374 (D. C. Cir. 
2018) (then Circuit judge Kavanaugh, dissenting, noting dispute about 
whether lower provider rates result from hospital merger would result from 
increase efficiency or anticompetitive suppression of input prices).  See also 
Elena Prager & Matthew Schmitt, Employer Consolidation and Wages: 
Evidence from Hospitals (SSRN working paper Jun 2019), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3391889 (citing 
evidence that hospital mergers in concentrated markets can result in wage 
suppression for employees such as nurses and that the dominant explanation 
if employer power over labor). 
97 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note __. 
98 On merger law’s concentration thresholds, see 4 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶925-932 (4th ed. 2017). On 
their application in buy-side markets, see Id., ¶¶980-982. 
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debate concerned variations on the Pareto principle.99  The substance 
of the debate considered how to turn some perception of individual 
welfare into conclusions about the aggregate welfare of society. 
Under the Pareto principle no change can be said to improve welfare 
unless it makes at least one person better off and no one worse off.  A 
voluntary agreement with no effect on anyone else qualifies, because 
it makes both parties better off.  Thus economics’ strong preference 
for free market exchange.  No policy that affects larger groups is a 
Pareto improvement unless it has unanimous consent.100  Since every 
government policy produces both gainers and losers, pure Pareto left 
economic policy with few options. 
While the idea of a welfare “tradeoff” first entered antitrust 
debate in the 1960s and 1970s,101 the notion of a tradeoff involving 
economic actions that harmed some people while benefitting others 
had emerged in welfare economics by the 1930s. Nicholas Kaldor 
and John Hicks tried to find workarounds consistent with the Pareto 
Principle that might nevertheless permit economic decision making 
imposed on unwilling actors.102  Under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, a 
change improves welfare if the gains experienced by gainers is 
sufficiently large that they are able to compensate the losers fully out 
of their gains and still be at least as well off.103  Both Pareto and 
Kaldor-Hicks are attempts at a “general” welfare test, or one that 
applies to everyone who is affected by the change.  Kaldor-Hicks 
acknowledges the possibility of welfare tradeoffs, while pure Pareto 
 
99 In VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1906; Aldo 
Montesano, trans., 1971). 
100 For a good introduction to the issues, see Howard F. Chang, A Liberal 
Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 
YALE L.J. 173 (2000). 
101See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
102Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions and Inter-personal Comparisons 
of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 553 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939).  See also ARTHUR C. PIGOU, 
THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). 
103See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509 (1980). 
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does not.  Kaldor-Hicks also lies at the heart of modern cost-benefit 
analysis.104  Unlike pure Pareto, it typically requires cardinal (i.e., 
quantified) measures of the gains and losses. 
A move from competition to monopoly flunks the Kaldor-
Hicks principle because the losses (wealth transfer from higher prices 
plus deadweight loss) would be greater than the gains (higher 
profits).105  Thus the idea that welfare “tradeoffs” exist in policy 
making was well known in economics106 before Williamson wrote 
his famous article on welfare tradeoffs in antitrust.107 What 
Williamson added was the idea that some creations of monopoly 
could be accompanied by productive efficiency gains. 
One of Williamson’s points was that we should not evaluate 
monopoly by comparing it to competition under the same cost 
conditions, which always show monopoly to be bad.  Rather, one 
must look at how the monopoly is created in order to see if there are 
compensating productive efficiency gains.  So the revised statement 
about monopoly becomes something like “a movement from 
competition to monopoly is bad only if the resulting deadweight loss 
exceeds any resulting gains in efficiency.”  This is a general welfare 
test because, it looks at all those who are affected in one way or the 
other by the creation of monopoly.  Impact on output is not decisive 
because a welfare improvement can conceivably result from practices 
 
104See Robin W. Broadway, The Welfare Foundations of Cost-benefit 
Analysis, 84 ECON. J. 926 (1974). 
105Developed in Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the 
Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934).  See 
also Nancy Ruggles, The Welfare Basis of the Marginal Cost Pricing 
Principles, 17 REV. ECON. STUD. 29 (1949); David Schwartzman, The 
Burden of Monopoly 68 J. Pol. Econ. 627 (1960). 
106E.g., I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1950); 
James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics and Political 
Economy, 2 J. L. & ECON. 124 (1959); Kenneth J. Arrow, Little’s Critique 
of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV. 923 (1951). 
107Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare 
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968).  See discussion supra, text at 
notes __. 
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that reduce output as well as those that increase it.  The principal 
difference is that a practice that reduces output will require efficiency 
gains to make it welfare improving. A practice that simply increases 
output will improve welfare even if there are no gains in productive 
efficiency.108 
The Williamson proposal would proclaim an antitrust practice 
such as a merger to be competitively harmful only if the resulting 
welfare losses from increased monopoly exceeded any welfare gains 
from increased productive efficiency.109 In making this argument, 
Williamson identified monopoly welfare with the deadweight loss 
that results from reduced output and higher prices.110 As 
contemporary economist critics pointed out, by the time Williamson 
was writing it was already clear that this approach seriously 
understated the social cost of monopoly. In particular, Williamson 
underestimated the price increases that would result and ignored the 
social costs of the processes by which monopoly is created.111  If a 
monopoly is worth $100, then a firm would be willing to spend any 
amount up to $100 to attain it, and those expenditures might be 
socially costly rent seeking or predatory destruction.112 
Also significant was that Williamson performed this analysis 
by starting out with perfect competition as a baseline and then looked 
for increased monopoly losses and increased productive efficiency as 
 
108 For example, a movement from monopoly toward competition increases 
welfare even if costs do not change. 
109Williamson, supra note __ at 21 (discussed in BORK, PARADOX, supra 
note __ at 107). 
110 See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
111See Michael E. DePrano and Jeffrey B. Nugent, Economies as an 
Antitrust Defense: Comment, 59 AM. ECON. REV. 947, 949-950 (1969), 
relying on David R. Kamerschen, An Estimation of the Welfare Losses from 
Monopoly in the American Economy, 4 WESTERN ECON. J. 221 (1966). 
112See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 
J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975). 
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a market moved from that point to monopoly.113  If he had started out 
with a market that already exhibited significant monopoly and 
estimated the effects of a further increase in monopoly, he would 
have come to much different conclusions.  In such cases a much 
greater productive efficiency gain is needed to offset the incremental 
welfare loss from monopoly.114 
“Consumer” welfare is not what Williamson was 
contemplating in his tradeoff article.  It branded practices as efficient, 
and thus not worthy of antitrust attack, even if they reduced output 
and harmed consumers.  By contrast, “consumer” welfare looks 
exclusively at the welfare of consumers and is unwilling to make 
tradeoffs with others.  If something harms consumers it decreases 
consumer welfare.  This distinctive concept of consumer welfare also 
shows up in the economics literature in the first half of the twentieth 
century, mainly in discussions of welfare economics and tax 
policy.115 In antitrust writing, however, it is largely a creature of the 
1960s and after. 
 
113See Williamson, supra note __ at 21 (graph illustrating perfect 
competition as starting point). 
114See Herbert Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle 
Imperiled?, 45 J. CORP. L. 65, 70 & n.17 (2019).  In the context of mergers 
in imperfect markets, see HOVENKAMP FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, 
supra note __, §12.2b. 
115See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, Countervailing Power, 44 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1 (1954) (defending value of consumer welfare as an economic goal, 
although unclear about the precise meaning); John C. Haranyi, Welfare 
Economics of Variable Tastes, 21 REV. ECON. STUD. 204 (1953) 
(discussing how changes in consumer taste affect consumer welfare); R. K. 
Davidson, The Alleged Excess Burden of an Excise Tax in the Case of an 
Individual Consumer, 20 REV. ECON. STUD. 209 (1952) (on effect of excise 
taxes when passed on from merchant to consumer); Alex Hunter, Product 
Differentiation and Welfare Economics, 69 Q.J. ECON. 533 (1955) (product 
differentiation increases consumer welfare because consumers prefer a 
variety of products); Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource 
Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77 84 (1954) (monopoly harms consumer 
welfare); Robert S. Lynd, The Consumer Becomes a “Problem,” 173 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SOC. SCI. 1 (1934) (prominent New Deal era 
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Bork actually adopted a properly defined consumer welfare 
approach to antitrust in the 1960s but then backtracked to a 
Wiliamsonian welfare tradeoff approach when he wrote The Antitrust 
Paradox in 1978.116 In 1965 Bork had argued that “the sole 
appropriate value in this field of antitrust is the maximization of 
consumer want satisfaction.”117 Whatever “consumer want 
satisfaction” might mean, increased producer profits does not seem to 
capture it.  Bork expressly tied his conception of consumer welfare to 
increases in output.  For example, he argued, the two things 
prohibited by the Sherman Act, collusion and exclusion, were bad 
because they “enable[ed] the parties to restrict output, thus creating 
misallocation of resources.”118  In his thinking at that time, the 
plausible effects of a competition-affecting practice was either 
“efficiency or restriction of output,” but not both.119  He wrote a year 
later that: 
Acceptance of consumer want satisfaction as the law's 
ultimate value requires the courts to employ as their primary 
criterion the impact of any agreement upon output, and thus 
to determine whether the net effect of the agreement is to 
 
sociologist decrying shift of government policy concern away from the 
welfare of consumers and toward that of business).  See also Covey T. 
Oliver, The Fair Trade Acts, 17 Tex. L. Rev. 391 (1939) (arguing that 
resale price maintenance (“fair trade”) harms consumer welfare).  Cf. John 
A. Hobson, Neo-Classical Economics in Britain, 40 POL. SCI. Q. 337 
(1925) (arguing that neoclassicalism rejected classicism’s theory of value 
based on costs to one that was based on the aggregate welfare of producers 
and consumers). 
116ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF, especially at 107-112 (1978). 
117Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price 
Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J 775, 780 (1965). 
118Id. at 781; Robert H. Bork, A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey, 76 
YALE L.J. 731, 740 (1968) (“output effect is a valid criterion because it is 
related to consumer welfare”). 
119Bork, Rule of Reason, supra note __ at 832. 
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create efficiency, and thereby increase output or, 
alternatively, to restrict output.120 
The entire thrust of Bork’s argument in the 1960s was that the 
purpose of the antitrust laws was to pursue practices that reduce 
output.  These pieces were all written prior to the publication of 
Oliver Williamson’s welfare tradeoff article in 1968. 
By the time Bork published The Antitrust Paradox a decade 
later, however, he had read Williamson and had changed his mind.121  
Now he was willing to accept that even a practice such as a merger 
that reduced output significantly could be efficient if the gains from 
productive efficiency exceeded the welfare losses of the output 
reduction. 
While Bork accepted the welfare tradeoff model in The 
Antitrust Paradox, he largely limited it to the tradeoff that occurs 
between consumers and producers, not giving much attention to 
effects on third parties.122  To illustrate, under this model a price-
increasing joint venture that produced $1000 in consumer losses from 
higher prices, but $1200 in increased producer profits from a 
combination of cost reductions and higher margins would be counted 
as a welfare gain and thus should be legal.123  Bork did not even 
consider the economic harm done to third parties such as excluded 
competitors, and these can be significant.124 
One particularly damaging feature of the welfare tradeoff 
model as Williamson developed it and Bork paraphrased it was that a 
relatively small profit increase for producers would be sufficient to 
 
120Bork, The Rule of Reason II, 75 Yale L.J. 373, 375 (1966) (emphasis 
added). 
121BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note __, 107-112. 
122Bork, Id. 
123For graphic illustrations, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §12.2b 
(6th ed. 2020). 
124 See Id., §1.3c,d. 
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offset rather large price increases to consumers. As a result, even 
practices that reduced output and raised price significantly were 
thought to promote welfare.  Williamson concluded that under typical 
assumptions about elasticities of demand a cost reduction of 1% - 4% 
would be sufficient to offset a price increase of about 20%.125  “More 
generally it is evident that a relatively modest cost reduction is 
usually sufficient  to offset relatively large price increases.”126  This 
led Williamson to conclude that “a merger which yields non- trivial 
real economies must produce substantial market power and result in 
relatively large price increases for the net allocative effects to be 
negative.”127  This conclusion was controversial.128 
Further, both Williamson and Bork acknowledged that 
interpreting antitrust welfare in this way could result in tolerance of 
monopolistic margins.  As Bork acknowledged, quoting Williamson: 
Inasmuch as the income distribution which occurs is usually 
large relative to the size of the dead-weight loss, attaching 
even a slight weight to income distribution effects can 
sometimes influence the overall valuation significantly.129 
For example, a practice that produced $1000 in monopoly profits and 
a corresponding loss of $1000 in consumers’ surplus would be 
efficient if it produced a $200 deadweight loss offset by $210 in 
productive efficiency savings. These numbers, which are not 
unrealistic, entailed that antitrust policy would close its eyes to 
enormous price increases above cost in the name of unproven 
efficiencies. 
In addition, Williamson did not acknowledge the severe 
measurement difficulties that would accompany his welfare tradeoff 
 
125Williamson, Economies, supra note __ at 22. 
126Ibid. 
127Id. at 23. 
128See DePrano and Nugent, supra note __. 
129BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note __ at 111, quoting Williamson, 
Welfare Tradeoff, supra note __ at 27-28. 
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model.130  The approach that Bork developed in The Antitrust 
Paradox did acknowledge that problem, but it came up with a 
damaging solution from which antitrust policy has not fully 
recovered.  Not only did he consider the welfare tradeoff to be 
incapable of measurement, he denied that the efficiencies themselves 
could be quantified.  Using economies of scale as an example, he 
concluded that the problem of efficiency measurement is “utterly 
insoluble.”131  Rather, efficiencies should be taken on faith.  His use 
of economies of scale as an example is further ironic because he was 
speaking of practices that reduce output rather than increase it. 
The Measurement of Efficiencies 
Bork’s never explained the basis for his conclusion that 
productive efficiencies are simply incapable of measurement.  The 
efficiencies in question are production efficiencies, which are cost 
reductions or quality improvements that attend changes in a firm’s 
scope, technology, or methods.  They are measured by computing 
savings in production or distribution costs, multiplied by the 
predicted number of production units to which the new technology 
will apply.  Measurement of these things can be difficult, but to say 
that the problem of efficiency measurement is “utterly insoluble” 
suggests that a firm has no means for determining whether an 
investment in new technology or processes is worthwhile.  It also 
suggests that a competitive firm contemplating acquisition of another 
firm would never know the size of efficiency gains.  As a result, they 
 
130On the measurement difficulties of assessing antitrust practices under a 
general welfare test, see Hovenkamp, Imperiled, supra note __ at 71-72. 
131BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note __ at 126.  Bork reached this 
conclusion by going off on a tangent that had nothing to do with the 
question at hand, which was how to measure economies of scale.  Rather, 
he looked at all of the factors that affect firm size, including management, 
finance, and marketing.  But the issue is only whether adoption of a 
particular technological change reduces costs, and by how much.  See id., 
quoting E.A.G. ROBINSON, THE STRUCTURE OF COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY 
12 (1958). 
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would have no mechanism for estimating how much they should be 
willing to pay. 
But the fact is that firms do these things all the time.  A firm 
that invests, say, $50,000,000 in improved assembly line technology 
certainly estimates what expected gains must be in order to warrant 
the conclusion that this is a good investment.132  Many mergers occur 
at a substantial premium above current stock prices – an act that is 
rational only on the assumption that the firm has been able to make at 
least a serviceable estimate of gains.  As with any predictive science, 
estimating productive efficiency gains from a particular future 
investment involves assumptions that may not always obtain, but to 
say that these changes are utterly incapable of measurement, as Bork 
did, reflects lack of knowledge about how firms make decisions. 
 Bork did antitrust a significant disservice by sticking with the 
term “consumer welfare” to describe the approach he took in The 
Antitrust Paradox, even though it deviated from his earlier writing 
that had measured consumer welfare appropriately, strictly by 
relation to higher output and lower prices.133  This became 
increasingly troublesome as it operated to justify ever increasing 
margins and prices, all the while proclaiming them consistent with 
the consumer welfare principle.134 
This conception of “consumer welfare” haunts antitrust to this 
day.  Under it, for example, the dissenters in the Supreme Court’s 
Actavis decision could speak of antitrust as adhering to a consumer 
welfare principle even as they would have approved a practice (pay-
 
132On the methodologies, see ROBIN C. SICKLES & VALENTIN ZELENYUK, 
MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTIVITY AND EFFICIENCY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (2019); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 
(Emili Grifell-Tatje, et al., eds. 2018); THE MEASUREMENT OF 
PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH (Harold O. Fried, 
et al, eds., 2008). 
133See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
134See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and 
the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 836 (2014). 
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for-delay) that resulted in very substantially higher prices to 
consumers.135 Or the majority in the American Express decision 
could profess adherence to the consumer welfare principle even as 
they were approving a practice that resulted in higher consumer 
prices and merchant costs every single time it was applied.136  In both 
cases the practice was highly profitable to producers, and that was all 
that mattered. 
Very likely, one of the reasons that the consumer welfare 
principle has faced so much opposition from the antitrust left137 is 
that many people do not understand its meaning.  By identifying the 
principle with Bork, they see high profits and reduced opportunities 
for labor as its principal products.138  Of course, this is not true of 
everyone. Some of the consumer welfare principle’s detractors 
simply prefer a regime that protects small business or opposes large 
firms because of their political power or perhaps some other reason. 
 
135See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting, along with Justices Scalia and Thomas).  In a pay-for-delay 
settlement a patentee with a weak patent pays an alleged infringer to stay 
out of the market.  See HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra 
note __, §5.5c3. 
136Ohio v. American Express, 138 S.Ct. 2274, 2290 (2018) (Thomas, J., for 
the majority).  See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, 44 J. CORP. L. 713 
(2018); HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note __, §10.10.  
The challenged practice forbad merchants from offering customers a lower 
price in exchange for using a cheaper credit card. 
137See Hovenkamp, Imperiled, supra note __. 
138E.g., BARRY LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND 
THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION 136 (2011); Thomas J. Horton, The 
Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago 
School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to structural and 
Behavioral Antitrust Analyses, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469, 502 (2011); Carl 
T. Bogus, The New Road to Serfdom: The Curse of Bigness and the Failure 
of Antitrust, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 16-17 (2015); Sandeep Vaheesan, 
The Twilight of the Technocrats’ Monopoly on Antitrust?, 127 YALE L.J. 
FORUM 980, 988 (2018). 
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CAUSATION AND REMEDIES 
 Antitrust enforcement requires both a theory of harm and a 
theory of causation. The rhetoric of antitrust enforcement often 
speaks of private plaintiffs as “private attorneys general.”139 In fact, 
however, both the statutory structure of antitrust’s enforcement 
provisions as well as nonstatutory doctrine distinguishes sharply 
between public and private enforcers.  For example, the Supreme 
Court’s Illinois Brick decision evoked the “private attorney general” 
bromide even as it restricted the range of private enforcement to 
something far less than the power of the enforcement agencies.140 
 The distinction between private and public enforcement is 
reflected mainly in causation requirements, which draw heavily from 
traditional criminal law and tort theory.  Only the private enforcer 
must show particular causation and individual harm.  For example, 
the police officer can enforce the law against drunk driving even 
though there is no accident, and no one is hurt.  The legal violation is 
all that is required, because the rationale for the police officer’s 
duties is management of risk.  A private plaintiff, by contrast, 
ordinarily needs to show some kind of actual or specifically 
threatened injury caused by the violation. 
Causation in the Antitrust Remedial Provisions 
 The antitrust statutes create a tort-like approach to causation 
in private actions. By contrast, the public enforcement statutes 
contain no causation requirement at all. Under them, the Attorney 
General has the authority to “prevent and restrain” antitrust 
violations, with no expressed requirement that the violation has 
caused any harm.141  The Federal Trade Commission operates under 
 
139 Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977); Perma Life Mufflers, 
Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 147 (1968) (Fortas, j., concurring); 
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 739 Fed. Appx. 890, 894 (9th Cir. 2018); Novell, Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 317-318 (4th Cir. 2007); In re High-Tech 
Employee Antitrust Litig., 985 F.2d 1167, 1179 (N.D.Cal. 2013). 
140Illinois Brick, id. at 746 (restricting private damages recoveries to direct 
purchasers). 
141 15 U.S.C. §25: 
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similar authority “to prevent” firms “from using unfair methods of 
competition” – once again, with no causation requirement.142 
These provisions stand in sharp contrast to antitrust’s private 
action provisions. Section 4 of the Clayton Act awards treble 
damages to a private plaintiff who can prove that he was “injured in 
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
antitrust laws.”143  Section 15 of the Clayton Act provides an 
injunction to a firm who can show “threatened loss or damage by a 
violation of the antitrust laws….”144 
The difference in substantive reach between the private and 
public equity provisions is also notable. The statute authorizing 
private antitrust injunctions permits them 
“under the same conditions and principles as injunctive relief 
against threatened conduct that will cause loss or damage is 
granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such 
proceedings…”145 
Those conditions and principles include a showing of an “inadequate 
remedy at all,” “irreparable harm,” and a balance of interests favoring 
injunctive relief.146 
 
The several district courts of the United States are invested with 
jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of this Act, and it 
shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys, in their 
respective districts, under the direction of the Attorney General, to 
institute proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such 
violations. 
14215 U.S.C. §45(2): 
The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent 
persons …  from using unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce. 
14315 U.S.C. §15. 
144 15 U.S.C. §26. 
145Ibid. 
146E.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) 
(listing the four requirements for a permanent injunction as (1) irreparable 
injury; (2) inadequacy of remedies at law, such as damages; (3) that the 
balance of hardships favors the plaintiff; and (4) that the public interest 
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By contrast, the statute authorizing the United States as enforcer 
to obtain an injunction imposes no such limitation.  It simply 
authorizes the government to use the courts to “prevent and restrain” 
antitrust violations, simpliciter.147  The inference is thus strong that 
Congress did not intend to limit the Antitrust Division’s equity 
enforcement power to historical principles of equity.148 As Judge 
Wyzanski once observed, “[i]n the antitrust field the courts have been 
accorded, by common consent, an authority they have in no other 
branch of enacted law….”149 
  One other causation-related requirement that applies to private 
parties but not public enforcers is “antitrust injury,” which is a 
nontextualist limitation on both private damages actions and private 
suits in equity. Literally, §4 of the Clayton Act says that “any person” 
who is injured “by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” 
has standing to obtain damages.150  That is, it requires only cause-in-
fact. The additional requirement of antitrust injury originated with 
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s opinion in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, a damages action challenging a vertical merger.151  Pueblo, 
the plaintiff, operated a bowling alley in Pueblo, Colorado. Its 
competitor Belmont Lanes was in financial distress and deeply 
indebted to its franchisor, Brunswick.152 Under a program of buying 
up failing franchisees, Brunswick purchased Belmont Lanes, injected 
 
would not be disserved by an injunction).  See also Beacon Theatres, Inc,. 
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (antitrust claim) 
14715 U.S.C. §25. 
148Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, which authorizes temporary injunctions, is 
a more limited.  It permits the granting of preliminary relief “Upon a proper 
showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission’s 
likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public 
interest….”  15 U.S.C. §53(b).  At this writing the Supreme Court has 
agreed to decide whether that provision entitles the FTC to seek 
disgorgement of improper gains.  FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 
F.3d 764 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 141 S.Ct. 194 (2020). 
149 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F.Supp. 295, 348 
(D.Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
150 15 U.S.C. §15. 
151 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
152 For a fuller statement of the facts, see NBO Indus. Treadway Co., Inc. v. 
Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1975), which the Supreme Court 
reversed. 
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new money into it, and rehabilitated it.  Pueblo’s lawsuit claimed that 
the acquisition was an unlawful merger, and that it was injured by the 
need to compete with a rejuvenated rival. 
Clearly, Pueblo suffered injury-in-fact that was “caused” by the 
acquisition.  We can generally presume that a firm is injured when its 
failing competitor is rehabilitated. Whether the acquisition was 
substantively unlawful under the merger laws is another matter, and 
the Supreme Court did not resolve it.153  Nevertheless, the facts 
require a double take: the plaintiff was effectively complaining about 
more rather than less competition in the Pueblo, Colorado, bowling 
market.  That was too much even for Justice Marshall, a liberal who 
believed in aggressive antitrust enforcement.154  He concluded for the 
Court that a private plaintiff must show not merely injury-in-fact 
caused by an antitrust violation, but also “antitrust injury.”  That is, 
injury “of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and 
that flows from that which makes defendant’s acts unlawful.”155  
Manifestly it was not the purpose of the merger laws to protect firms 
from being injured by more competition.  A few years later the 
Supreme Court extended Brunswick to private actions seeking an 
injunction.156  The doctrine does not apply to the government acting 
as enforcer because, as previously noted, the government need not 
show injury at all. 
Given that antitrust’s remedial statutes articulate these causation 
requirements, it would seem superfluous to have additional causation 
requirements in the substantive statutes themselves.  In fact, however, 
the issue is more complicated. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts in restraint of 
trade, leaving it to the courts to define that term. After Justice 
 
153 The Third Circuit did not resolve the legality question either but rejected 
the defendant’s request for a j.n.o.v. and remanded for a new trial.  523 F.2d 
262, 279 (3d Cir. 1975).  The district court had approved a jury’s verdict 
finding a violation.  364 F. Supp. 316 (D.N.J. 1973). 
154 E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) 
(Marshall, j., applying per se rule against ancillary restraint in joint venture 
with a small market share after declaring that the antitrust laws are “the 
Magna Carta of free enterprise”). 
155Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. 
156Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 194 (1986). 
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Peckham’s initial indication in the Trans-Missouri case that §1 
reaches “every” contract the Court backtracked and concluded that it 
prohibited only those agreements that restrain trade 
“unreasonably.”157 Section 2’s monopolization provision is similarly 
interpreted to reach only acts that appear to be reasonably capable of 
monopolizing.158  Nothing in the statutory language considers exactly 
what these requirements are, or even whether there need to be any 
effects at all. 
Showing that an agreement restrains trade requires adequate 
evidence that the agreement is of a type that realistically threatens an 
output reduction and corresponding price increase.  The government 
as enforcer needs to show that, but it need not show actual injury.  
The private plaintiff must additionally show individual injury 
resulting from a restraint of trade.159  But this is a requirement of the 
private action provision, §4 of the Clayton Act, not of §1 of the 
Sherman Act directly.  This injury could be an overcharge in the case 
of damages, or market exclusion in the case of a boycott or exclusive 
dealing agreement.  Section 2 monopolization cases work the same 
way. The government must show conduct that reasonably seems 
capable of causing reduced output and increased prices by excluding 
a rival.  The private plaintiff must additionally show an actual effect 
to support a damages action or an individually threatened effect to 
support an injunction.  The required private effect could be either a 
higher price which it paid, or lost profits from market exclusion. 
The substantive provisions of the Clayton Act differ from the 
Sherman Act in that they explicitly incorporate an “effects” test.  All 
three of the Clayton Act’s substantive provisions reach conduct only 
 
157United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290, 312-313, 
328 (1897) (“the plain and ordinary meaning of such language is not limited 
to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable restraint of trade, but 
all contracts are included in such language”), qualified by Standard Oil Co. 
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 90-92 (1911); and United States 
v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
158 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶651 (4th ed. 2015).  See also United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 79 
(D.C.Cir. 2001) (quoting ¶651c: “reasonably appear capable of making a 
significant contribution to … maintaining monopoly power”). 
159 See 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶338 (5th ed. 2021) (forthcoming). 
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“where the effect may be substantially to lessen competition or tend 
to create a monopoly.”  Section 2 of the Act, later amended by the 
Robinson-Patman act, prohibits certain price differences “where the 
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly…”160 
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which governs exclusive dealing 
and tying, prohibits sales on the condition that the buyer not deal 
with a competitor, “where the effect of such … sale … may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly….”161 
Finally §7 of the Clayton Act prohibits covered mergers “where 
in any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any 
section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a 
monopoly.”162 
For all three Clayton Act provisions, the causation requirement is 
diluted by the language “where the effect may be,” indicating that 
certainty is not a requirement. The courts subsequently made clear 
that this effects language was triggered by “probabilities” rather than 
“certainties.”163 Clearly, the statutes do not require that the conduct 
actually raised price or excluded firms from the market, but only that 
the effect “may be” that they would do so.  This is a more express 
invitation to include an element of risk management into public 
enforcement.  For example, it enables such procedures as pre-merger 
evaluation and condemnation of proposed acquisitions.164 The 
 
16015 U.S.C. §13.  The Robinson-Patman amendments, added in 1936 added 
“or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either 
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination….”  Ibid. 
161 15 U.S.C. §14. 
162 15 U.S.C. §18. 
163E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962) 
(Congress was indicating “that its concern was with probabilities, not 
certainties.”).  See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) 
(“The section [of the Clayton Act] can deal only with probabilities, not with 
certainties.”).  More recently, see St. Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa, 
Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2015) 
(“judicial analysis necessarily focuses on ‘probabilities, not certainties,’” 
quoting Brown Shoe, supra). 
164See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 
¶990 (4th ed. 2017). 
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additional requirement imposed on private challengers derives purely 
from the private action statutes and require actual or individually 
threatened harm.  For example, merely showing a merger that crosses 
a particular concentration threshold can permit the government to 
obtain an injunction, but a private plaintiff would have to show some 
more specific harm, such as higher prices or exclusion. 
Public v. Private Enforcement: Causation as Management of Risk 
Many of the harms that antitrust law condemns are apparent even 
though they are difficult to quantify, and certainly in the short run.  
One good example is the antitrust’s legitimate concern with restraints 
on innovation.  Such restraints are particularly pernicious because the 
social value of innovation is very high.  Indeed, today a broad 
consensus exists that the economic gains from innovation exceed the 
gains from increased competition under constant technology, and by 
a significant amount.165  A corollary is that a restraint on innovation 
can cause significantly more economic harm than a restraint on price 
or output of an existing product. 
One big problem, however, is that innovation is much less well 
 
165The classic statement is Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the 
Aggregate Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. STUD. 32 (1957) 
(concluding that 90% of economic growth came from innovation rather 
than market competition under constant technology).  The literature uses a 
wide range of methodologies and techniques but is virtually unanimous that 
innovation is a heavy if not the dominant contributor to economic growth.  
Important examples include Rana P. Maradana, et al., Does Innovation 
Promote Economic Growth Evidence from European Countries, 6 J. 
INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 (2017); Iftekhar Hasan & 
Christopher L. Tucci, The Innovation-Economic Growth Nexus: Global 
Evidence, 39 RES. POL’Y 1264 (2010); Bart Verspagen, Innovation and 
Economic Growth, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION (Jan 
Fagerberg and David C. Mowery, eds., 2009)  Other, older work includes 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at ch. 1 (2003); LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD (2001); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: 
Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2235 (2000); 
Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation 
and the Innovation Process, 29 RES. POL’Y 531 (2000); JARED DIAMOND, 
GUNS, GERMS & STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES, ch. 13 (1999). 
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disciplined, and thus less predictable in individual cases, than is price 
competition under constant technology.166  Today we have good tools 
for relating changes in output to price and making predictions about 
the price effects of mergers or other practices that tend to limit 
output.  Innovation, by contrast, is radically unpredictable.167 
Significant risk but uncertain individual prediction is a frequent 
characteristic of antitrust enforcement, but particularly in highly 
innovative markets.  One consequence of this is differentiated 
causation requirements depending on who the plaintiff is.  For the 
public enforcer, the principal concern is management of risks, some 
of which may be uncertain.  For the private plaintiff, the concern is 
actual or individually threatened harm to its own prospects. 
A good example is the Microsoft litigation, a case brought by the 
government and seeking equity relief for conduct that included 
restraints on innovation.  Against the defendant’s argument for 
stronger proof of causation the court found no case law support for a 
plaintiff’s requirement to “present direct proof that a defendant’s 
continued monopoly power is precisely attributable to its 
anticompetitive conduct.”168  Rather, the court held in such a case 
causation could be inferred “from the fact that a defendant has 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct that “reasonably appear[s] 
capable of making a significant contribution to … maintaining 
monopoly power.”169  The court then added, 
We may infer causation when exclusionary conduct is aimed 
at producers of nascent competitive technologies as well as when 
it is aimed at producers of established substitutes. Admittedly, in 
the former case there is added uncertainty, inasmuch as nascent 
threats are merely potential substitutes. But the underlying proof 
problem is the same—neither plaintiffs nor the court can 
 
166 See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT, esp. chs. 1 & 2 (1911). 
167See Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 247 (2007). 
168United States vs. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(en banc) (per curiam). 
169Id., quoting 3 PHILLIP E AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶651C (3d ed. 1996). 
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confidently reconstruct a product's hypothetical technological 
development in a world absent the defendant's exclusionary 
conduct. To some degree, “the defendant is made to suffer the 
uncertain consequences of its own undesirable conduct.”170 
 The issue was whether Microsoft’s conduct had served to 
restrain the development of a rival internet browser, Netscape 
Navigator, facilitated by the Java computer language.  The court 
explained: 
Given this rather edentulous test for causation, the question in 
this case is not whether Java or Navigator would actually have 
developed into viable platform substitutes, but (1) whether as a 
general matter the exclusion of nascent threats is the type of 
conduct that is reasonably capable of contributing significantly to 
a defendant's continued monopoly power and (2) whether Java 
and Navigator reasonably constituted nascent threats at the time 
Microsoft engaged in the anticompetitive conduct at issue. As to 
the first, suffice it to say that it would be inimical to the purpose 
of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free reign to squash 
nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will—particularly in 
industries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent 
paradigm shifts.  As to the second, the District Court made ample 
findings that both Navigator and Java showed potential as 
middleware platform threats.171 
 These conclusions stand in sharp contrast to those in follow-
on private litigation against Microsoft challenging the same conduct.  
The facts in the Fourth Circuit’s Kloth v. Microsoft decision172 were 
taken entirely from the government’s litigation.  The plaintiffs were 
purchasers and users of Windows computers claiming that 
Microsoft’s conduct targeting Java technology restrained innovation 
and denied them the benefits of a more competitive market by 
“suppressing competitive technologies.”173 
 In rejecting that claim the Fourth Circuit agreed with the 
District Court that: 
 
170 Id., quoting 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, id., ¶651c. 
171Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 
172 Kloth vs. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2006). 
173 Id. at 322. 
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It would be entirely speculative and beyond the competence 
of a judicial proceeding to create in hindsight a technological 
universe that never came into existence. . . . It would be even 
more speculative to determine the relevant benefits and 
detriments that non-Microsoft products would have brought to the 
market and the relative monetary value . . . to a diffuse population 
of end users.174 
As a result, the court concluded, “the harms that the plaintiffs have 
alleged with respect to the loss of competitive technologies are so 
diffuse that they could not possibly be adequately measured.”  
Further, the problem “is not one of discovery and specific evidence, 
but of the nature of the injury claimed.”175 
 Analytically, these two approaches to the same conduct seem 
stunningly different.  The important difference does not lie in the 
conduct, however, but in the identity of the plaintiff.  The plaintiffs in 
Kloth were private persons seeking damages. They had to show not 
only a violation of §2 of the Sherman Act, but also that they had 
suffered measurable damages “by reason of” an antitrust violation, as 
the private enforcement statute required.  Quantifying the injury that 
might result from an innovation that was never developed would be 
impossible.  The court also dismissed a request for an injunction as 
stale under the doctrine of laches.176  The relevant harm was in the 
past, making an injunction useless. 
The Relationship of Violation, Causation, and Remedy 
 The antitrust enforcement statutes are frustratingly silent on 
questions about remedies, or about the relationship between remedies 
and various antitrust violations.  As previously noted, the public 
enforcement provision authorizes the Attorney General to “prevent 
and restrain” violations of “this act,” referring to all of the antitrust 
laws.  Further, the statute does this through an unrestricted grant of 
equitable power that does not distinguish among the various antitrust 
statutes and does not relate any particular violation to any particular 
remedy. 
When criminal enforcement is on the table the problem of 
 
174 Id. at 324. 
175 Ibid. 
176 Id. at 325-326. 
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indefiniteness is even more severe.  For example, both §§1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act stipulate that violators “shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony….”177  In fact, the same statutory language covers both 
criminal and civil violations with no differentiation between them.  
Further, criminal liability is clearly presumed from the language.  For 
example, §2 states that “Every person who shall monopolize … shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony.”178 
Notwithstanding that language, today most violations of §1 of 
the Sherman Act are civil, as are virtually all pure §2 violations.  
Over the years, the courts and enforcement agencies have evolved a 
kind of common law of remedies.  First, both the Department of 
Justice179 and the Supreme Court180 have produced guidance about 
when criminal liability is appropriate. 
Second – and much less explicitly – the courts have evolved 
some presumptions for relating particular antitrust offenses to 
particular remedies. For example, outside of the merger context, 
“structural” (i.e., breakup) relief against single firms is largely 
restricted to §2 of the Sherman Act.  This is a possible explanation of 
the legal theory behind the various government antitrust complaints 
filed in late 2020 against Google and Facebook.181 The 
overwhelming majority of practices alleged in the complaints are for 
various types of agreements.  These include simple deals, such as 
Google’s payment of money to Apple to make Google Search the 
default browser on iPhones.  They also include restrictions in various 
developmental agreements with app creators, advertisers, or others 
preventing them from favoring or using competing technologies. 
Further, they complain about licensing agreements, such as Google 
restrictions imposed on the manufacturers of Android devices.182  
 
177 15 U.S.C. §§1,2. 
178 15 U.S.C. §2. 
179 See https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement.  
180E.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (criminal §1 
case requires proof of mens rea); and see 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶303c3 (5th ed. 2021) (forthcoming). 
181See Compl., United States v. Google, LLC (1:20-cv-03010, D.D.C., Oct. 
20, 2020); Compl., Colorado v. Google, #_____ (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2020); 
Compl.,  FTC v. Facebook, Inc. #___ (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020). 
182 The allegations in the various complaints are analyzed in Hovenkamp, 
Platform Monopoly, supra note __ at __. 
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While these practices are diverse, what they all have in common is 
that they are reachable under §1 of the Sherman Act, and there is a 
long history of applying §1 in these ways. 
Nevertheless, the complaints are brought almost exclusively 
under §2 of the Sherman Act, with a couple of narrow exceptions.  
The Antitrust Division’s Google complaint is entirely under §2, as is 
the “Colorado” state AG complaint.  The “Texas” AG complaint 
does include a count under §1, but that complaint also includes an 
allegation of a market division or price fixing agreement between 
Google and Facebook.183 The Federal Trade Commission’s Facebook 
complaint proceeds entirely under the principles of §2 of the 
Sherman Act,184 even though that complaint challenges Facebook’s 
acquisitions of Instagram and WhatApp – practices that are 
historically challenged as mergers under §7 of the Clayton Act, or 
unlawful combinations under §1 of the Sherman Act. 
In general, it is easier to obtain liability for practices 
challengeable under §1 of the Sherman Act than it is for §2.  Further, 
the requisite market share minimums are typically lower.  For 
example, exclusionary contracts are generally reachable under §1 on 
market shares in the range of 30% to 40%, lower than the dominance 
requirement of §2.  This could be an issue in the Facebook case, 
where the FTC alleges a market share in the low 60s, and the market 
seems to be rather poorly defined.185 
One explanation for the Agencies’ and state AGs’ nearly 
exclusive use of §2 is that it is the preferred vehicle for obtaining 
structural relief.  Historically, that seems to be true.  Today we think 
 
183Complt., Texas v. Google, ¶2, Civil Action No. ___ (E.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 
2020). 
184While the FTC cannot enforce the Sherman Act direction, § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC to condemn “unfair 
methods of competition,” which includes everything covered by the 
Sherman Act plus an unspecified increment.  See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 
Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966) (“broad power of the Commission is 
particularly well established with regard to trade practices which conflict 
with the basic policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such 
practices may not actually violate these laws”); 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶302 (5th ed. 2021) 
(forthcoming). 
185 FTC Facebook Complt., supra note __. 
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of monopolization cases as “structural,” and as §1 cases as involving 
conduct.  As noted earlier, however, there is nothing in the statutes 
that compels such a distinction. 
A better way to think of the remedy problem is to pay little or 
no attention to which antitrust statute is being invoked and look 
straight to the issue of justification for and likely effects of a 
particular remedy.  If a firm with a nondominant market share is 
found to have engaged in unlawful exclusionary contracting the 
appropriate remedy in most cases is an injunction, whether the action 
is under §1 or §2 of the Sherman Act.186  A forced breakup is a 
highly disruptive remedy that should be applied only when we are 
reasonably sure that competition cannot be made to work in a 
particular market.  That is a factual and essentially economic inquiry, 
not an exercise in statutory interpretation.  The statutes do not speak 
to the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
 The temptation to get judges to do what Congress will not is 
strong. “I know it when I see it” approaches attempt to combine 
antitrust’s economic goals with concerns about political power, firm 
size or industrial concentration for its own sake, or some conception 
of fairness.  While well intended, they threaten to return us to a day 
when antitrust used very expansive rhetoric but was able to 
accomplish almost nothing.187 
 Rolling monopoly profits into a conception of consumer 
welfare as Bork did does just as much harm, perhaps even more, in 
the other direction.  The result of that policy has been not only higher 
 
186 For an example of a government §2 case against a contract practice 
seeking only an injunction, see United States v. Dentsply, Inc., 399 F.3d 
181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (government requested an injunction against 
exclusive dealing, even though defendant’s market share was 75-80% and 
fifteen times larger than any rival). 
187See Richard Hofstadter’s lamentation in What Happened to the Antitrust 
Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER 
ESSAYS 188 (1st ed. 1965), reprinted in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION 
POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert 
Hovenkamp eds., 2013) 
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prices, but also reduced output and innovation, harm to labor and to 
almost everyone else in the supply chain.  In our era price-cost 
margins are very high,188 labor’s share of the returns to production 
has declined sharply,189 economic growth is significantly less than it 
was in the mid-twentieth century,190 and economic inequality is near 
an all-time high.191 
Antitrust is not a cure-all for these problems, but it does have 
its role.  It does best when it sticks to its economic purposes and lets 
other legislative agendas handle the rest.  Even so, pushing output 
back up to competitive levels can do a great deal of good when 
combined with other policy choices. 
Statutory causation requirements favor public enforcement in 
areas such as technology and restraints on innovation, where many 
antitrust complaints implicate conduct whose precise effects are 
difficult to foresee but where the risk of harmful consequences is 
high.  That distinction seems fundamentally appropriate given the 
private motives that dominate so much of private antitrust litigation.  
Nevertheless, it places on the public enforcers an obligation to 





188See Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market 
Structure and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
189David Autor, et al, Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share, 107 
AM ECON REV: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 180, 181-83 (2017). 
190See https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/gdp-growth-annual. 
191See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE (2d ed. 2018). 
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